The Human Face of Economic Globalization: Mexican Migrants and their Support for Free Trade by Aldrich, John et al.
University of Nebraska at Omaha
DigitalCommons@UNO
Political Science Faculty Publications Department of Political Science
9-2008
The Human Face of Economic Globalization:
Mexican Migrants and their Support for Free Trade
John Aldrich
Duke University
Victoria DeFrencesco Soto
Northwestern University
Gregory A. Petrow
University of Nebraska at Omaha, gpetrow@unomaha.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/poliscifacpub
Part of the Political Science Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Department
of Political Science at DigitalCommons@UNO. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Political Science Faculty Publications by an authorized
administrator of DigitalCommons@UNO. For more information, please
contact unodigitalcommons@unomaha.edu.
Recommended Citation
Aldrich, John; Soto, Victoria DeFrencesco; and Petrow, Gregory A., "The Human Face of Economic Globalization: Mexican Migrants
and their Support for Free Trade" (2008). Political Science Faculty Publications. 11.
https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/poliscifacpub/11
The Journal of Latino-Latin American Studies  26 
The Journal of Latino-Latin American Studies, Volume 3, Number 2, Fall 2008, pp. 26-46 
 
 
 
 
 
The Human Face of Economic Globalization:   Mexican Migrants and their Support for 
Free Trade* 
 
 
        John H. Aldrich 
        Department of Political Science 
       Duke University 
       Victoria M. DeFrancesco Soto
                          Institute for Policy Research
                                                Northwestern University 
                      and 
                      Gregory A. Petrow 
                      Department of Political Science 
                      University of Nebraska, Omaha 
 
Abstract 
This paper presents the results from a focus group and an experiment 
conducted with Mexican immigrant farm workers as participants.  The 
idea is to investigate free trade attitudes among a group little studied in the 
debate over immigration and its role in globalization.  We can readily 
illustrate, as we do via our focus group participants, that many of these 
migrants understand their political situation.  Our focus then turns to the 
political psychology of these workers:  how does this understanding 
manifest itself in their political attitudes?  The experiment exposes them to 
a standard set of arguments for and against economic globalization drawn 
from actual newspaper accounts.  We find that this experimental design 
did prime the issue of economic globalization among those with a sense of 
self interest in the issue, implying that they held attitudes that the 
treatment brought to the “tops of their heads,” as it were.  This implication 
is further supported by the finding that a political value (in this case, 
valuing an active government) mediates the relationship between 
globalization messages and support for free trade, indicating that there is 
at least some structuring to their political opinions in this area. 
Keywords:  Mexican farmworkers, political participation, globalization, 
competitive advantage, free trade 
 
Economic globalization is loosely defined as lowering international barriers to the movement of 
economic goods and services (including capital and labor).  The standard argument since 
political economist David Ricardo is that lowering such barriers improves everyone’s 
circumstances due to the ability to capitalize on each nation’s comparative advantages (e.g. 
Ricardo 1895).  He demonstrated that, even if one nation is more efficient at producing 
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everything than some other nation, even then it is still Pareto superior to exchange on 
comparative advantage.  It is this basic notion that leads to the implication that increased flows 
of goods and services, of capital and labor alike, lead to Pareto improvements:  that is, these 
increased flows make at least some (and in principle all) better off, and no one worse off.  
However, labor flows, and especially the lowering of barriers to entry of labor, remain highly 
contentious. 
 While lowering barriers to trades and goods yields widely dispersed benefits (such as 
lower costs for consumers), the costs can be highly concentrated (e.g. the demise of the U.S. 
textile industry).  A key strategy advanced industrialized nations can use to adapt to these costs is 
to open borders: that is, to lower barriers to flows of labor, permitting cheaper labor to migrate.  
In the U.S., the relative permeability of borders has led millions of Latinos to migrate to the U.S. 
to take jobs that both pay better and are more plentiful here than in their home countries (Massey 
and Espinoza 1997).  The “human face” of this policy has created a pool of between three and 
five million agricultural migrant workers in the U.S., 80% of whom are foreign immigrants (and 
90% of these foreign workers are Mexican, Magana and Hovey 2003).   
 Mexican farm workers who immigrate to the U.S. provide an interesting setting for 
thinking about these issues.  They move here for economic reasons.  Typically, they come here 
to earn higher wages than they could receive at home, with the intention of sending any excess 
above living costs back to their families.  While this is a palpable benefit to these workers, some 
in the U.S. are concerned that the workers seem to be exploited when one compares their 
fortunes to those of typical Americans.  Indeed, the farm workers themselves are very clear that 
their standard of living, especially in the migrant farm worker communities, is low in absolute 
terms.   
 Given that many immigrants are undocumented, the more unscrupulous among their 
employers are able to exploit the workers’ situation by not providing decent housing or safe 
working conditions.  They know that it is unlikely that the farm workers themselves will be in a 
situation to complain.  They are not in that position because there are barriers to entry (that is, 
they need governmental approval and documentation to legally enter the U.S. and its work 
force), and if they avoid such barriers by undocumented entry, they are vulnerable to this 
exploitation.  In the usual economic sense, the entire set of partners to this set of exchanges are 
made better off nonetheless; and so, this is a strictly Pareto superior outcome, even if many 
might conclude that there is clearly a system of exploitation here as well.  As Amartya Sen once 
pointed out (1970, p.22), “In short, a society or an economy can be Pareto-optimal and still be 
perfectly disgusting.” 
 In this context, it seems particularly important to understand the attitudes and choices 
made by those at the front lines of the issues, as it were.  And thus, we return to the question of 
how Latino migrant workers react to economic globalization – do they tend to support it or 
oppose it, and why?  One could simply measure their support for globalization.  However, an 
even more useful way to evaluate this question is to study how these workers react to the 
globalization debate itself:  the pro- and con- messages which constitute that debate.  Gauging 
how they react to these messages will first reveal if their support for free trade increases or 
decreases depending on the type of message, but it will also reveal the magnitude of the changes, 
demonstrating how susceptible the workers’ free trade attitudes are to persuasion.  These workers 
confront a potential paradox:  they have sacrificed and risked a great deal to immigrate to the 
U.S. in pursuit of a better livelihood and a brighter future.  However, once they arrive, many 
enter a system of exploitation. 
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This contradiction suggests two possible views of the migrant workers’ support for free 
trade.  On the one hand, perhaps they take advantage of the opportunities that present themselves 
as a result of globalization without embracing the policy itself.  Given this view, workers enter 
the U.S. (legally or illegally) because the opportunity presents itself to work here for higher 
wages than in Mexico, but they are innocent as to how globalization leads to this opportunity.  In 
addition, resulting exploitation provides a counter weight to the economic benefits that the 
greater labor opportunities bring.  This view implies that workers should be persuadable as to the 
pros- and cons- of globalization because they have not linked their actions to the policy, and they 
personally experience both the advantages and disadvantages.   
Alternatively, perhaps workers possess awareness that globalization allows them access 
to the U.S. labor market, and they see valuable economic benefit accruing from that.  This view 
implies that workers’ free trade attitudes should be resistant to persuasion because they link those 
attitudes with the act of taking advantage of resulting opportunities.  As a result, any kind of free 
trade message will prime considerations of the policy and lead to greater support for it because, 
in the mind of the migrant worker, the strong benefits of the policy are evoked.  This conceptual 
approach, then, should reveal “where workers are at” in the globalization debate. 
This question matters because migrant workers have a right for their voices to be heard, 
even if they are not citizens in a formal sense.  By living in the U.S. and contributing their labor 
to the economy, they earn the right for their voices to be heard.  Indeed, political theorists wrestle 
with the question of where immigrants in democracies stand, given democratic theory (e.g. 
Heisler 2005, Benhabib 2005 and Baucock 2005).  Some argue that the division between 
“citizen” and “non-citizen” should fall away and that we should recognize their right to 
representation.  Given this view, we will conclude by considering what the views of the workers 
we studied were concerning free trade. 
In addition to its relevance to democratic theory, our study is of course also relevant to 
the political opinions of Latino migrants.  We ask readers to consider that political scientists are 
only now beginning to develop a literature on the political opinions of Latinos in general and of 
Latino immigrants in particular (de la Garza 2004, Uhlaner and Garcia 2001).  To date no 
studies at all consider Latino attitudes toward globalization, nor do the determinants of Latino’s 
support for free trade policies.  Given their place in the global economic marketplace, this is an 
especially crucial question for Latino migrant workers. 
In this paper we seek to further this line of research by considering how Latino migrant 
workers process information on globalization and how this information influences their support 
for trade policy.  The focus group will literally speak for itself.  We need, however, to develop 
the theory underlying our experiment.  We do so by developing a model of Latino migrant 
workers’ support for free trade.  Our analysis begins by developing our theory of direct, 
mediated, and moderated effects of pro- and con- free trade messages.1   We apply an 
information-processing model developed in political psychology to consider whether factors 
moderate this relationship, and we examine political values as a possible mediating variable.  We 
then turn to discuss our results. 
 
Theory and Research Design 
Theory:  Direct Effects 
 We seek to explain how media messages about trade policies affect preferences for free 
trade.  The treatment, therefore, is exposure to positive or negative messages about free trade, or 
to no experimental messages at all in the control condition.  We consider two possibilities.  The 
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first is that receiving any message serves to prime attitudes already held in the trade policy 
domain, making existing attitudes more accessible.  The immigrant/migrant population we 
studied is directly affected by free trade, and with such a vested interest, they may well have firm 
attitudes about this topic.  Their choice to come to the U.S. is rooted in precisely the kinds of 
economic considerations about which the U.S. and Mexico contest politically.  If our subjects 
have firm attitudes toward free trade, the treatment should prime those attitudes.  Thus, the 
treatment will bring to the fore already existent attitudes, without (necessarily) affecting the 
content or evaluative stance of those attitudes. 
The second possibility is that, because our prime is valenced, we also are able to test 
whether the message is persuasive: exposure to the positive treatment would, in that case, 
increase support for freer trade, while the negative treatment would decrease support.  The 
persuasion hypothesis begins with the observation that this population has low levels of 
education and other cognitive resources often associated with poorly formed or even non-existent 
attitudes (e.g. Zaller 1992).  There are two possibilities, in turn, that emerge from this fact.  One 
is that only some will have anything to prime.  Thus, those more invested in the issue or those 
more generally engaged in political considerations might hold attitudes, while others do not.  In 
this case, we would expect a moderating relationship, which we turn to below.2 
We might also expect the valenced nature of the prime to be persuasive.  While there is 
some evidence that those without attitudes on the subject at all might find a valenced prime 
sufficient to create new attitudes out of whole cloth (e.g. Petty and Wegener 1998), others expect 
that only those with at least some attitude structure in the general domain will be able to 
assimilate the information sufficiently to be persuaded by the message.  It is this position that 
leads Zaller, for example, to argue that those in the middle ranges of political sophistication will 
be those whose attitudes are most affected by persuasive messages.  People with more cognitive 
resources, such as those with greater education or political knowledge, have an easier time 
understanding political messages and thinking about them (e.g. Zaller 1992).  Those at the 
bottom have too little information and structure to be able to be persuaded, while those (few) at 
the top end have sufficiently strongly developed attitudes that they are able to counter argue 
against a potentially persuasive message.  We will test both of the possibilities:  that the 
messages may operate simply as primes, or as persuasive valences.  Hence, for direct effects, we 
will test the following hypotheses: 
 
H1:  Direct Effects 
 
H1a:  Priming:  The exposure to the treatment variable will directly prime 
existing attitudes on trade. 
 
H1b:  Persuasion:  The positive [negative] free trade message should increase 
[decrease] support for free trade directly. 
 
 
Theory:  Mediating Effects 
A relationship between two factors is mediated when the effect of an independent variable on a 
dependent measure occurs through, or in combination with, a third, mediator, and variable.  
“Mediators explain how external physical events take on internal psychological significance” 
(Baron and Kenny 1986, 1176).  The internal psychological significance that we are interested in 
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here is that of relevant political values, and how they may shape the way in which the treatment 
affects the outcome. 
In general and theoretical terms, political values have been shown to be strong predictors 
of political behavior in a variety of contexts (e.g. Kinder and Winters 2001, Feldman and 
Steenburgen 2001), typically in a hierarchical fashion; that is, reasoning seems to proceed from 
more general and abstract values to more specific and concrete policies.  The particular value 
most implicated as a possible mediator in our case is that of having a more or less active 
government.  That is, of course, the issue at question – changing the level of activity of the 
government.  Lower trade barriers result from reduced government activity, while higher barriers 
result from increased activity.  In this case, the value pertains to the degree of government 
intervention in the economy. 3  Of course, that is precisely the reason that this value may be 
expected to have an important effect on support or opposition to any particular trade policy 
proposal. 
Evocation of free trade in the treatment may well prime this value for many subjects, 
simply by discussing whether the government should be more or less actively involved.   Based 
on the economic consequences predicted by positive and negative free trade arguments, workers 
may also be persuaded to support either more or less active government.  Thus, just as with the 
effect that the treatment might have on support for trade policy as a specific issue, the treatment 
may serve as either a prime or a persuasive argument in shaping the value.  This treatment effect 
then would have a mediating effect by its role in shaping the valuing of active government and 
its effect in turn on support or opposition to the particular policy of free trade. 
 
H2:  Mediation Effects 
 
H2a: Priming:  Exposure to the treatment will either prime the value of 
active government, or it will prime the relationship between valuing an active 
government and preferences over trade policy. 
 
H2b: Persuasion:  Pro- [anti-] free trade messages will decrease [increase] 
valuing active government, and/or affect the relationship between the 
valuation of an active government and support for [opposition to] free trade.   
 
 We cannot, of course, make direct inferences about the role of valuing an active 
government on the policy, because the experimental design gives us randomization over 
treatments and not randomization over subjects (a point we discuss shortly).  However, we need 
to establish prima facie evidence that the value is relevant to subjects’ attitudes toward free trade 
policy.  We expect that valuing active government will cause opposition to free trade, given the 
assumed effect of values on policies (e.g. Sears and Funk 1999, Feldman and Steenburgen 2001).  
 
Theory:  Moderating Effects 
A relationship between two factors is moderated when it becomes stronger if a person is in one 
group, compared to another (Baron and Kenny 1986).  One particularly important class of 
moderator variables are those that divide the population into those with lesser or no developed 
attitude structures about the topic and those with stronger or more developed attitudes and 
attitudinal structures.  We consider the two most commonly employed indicators of this class.  
Political sophistication is a set of measures (such as level of education, political interest and 
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involvement, etc.) designed to order subjects by engagement in and knowledge about politics, 
assuming then that those higher in political sophistication are more likely to hold relevant 
political attitudes.  The second major indicator is self-interest.  Higher self-interest in the content 
of the political issue is presumed to be related to the probability that an individual holds 
developed attitudes toward that political issue.  In sum, we propose that attitudes and preferences 
on economic globalization issues are due in part to an individual’s level of political experience, 
skills and abilities they bring to the task (political sophistication) and their motivation for 
engaging the task (self-interest with respect to the policy).   
The priming effect should be directly tapped by these divisions.  Such variables divide 
the group into those having attitudes sufficiently developed to be accessible in the first place, and 
those possessing less developed structures or even no attitudes at all to be accessed.  We employ 
the Elaboration Likelihood Model (Petty and Cacioppo 1986; Petty and Wegener 1998) to 
consider differential message processing and, thus, persuasion.   In their model, persuasion is 
more likely to occur (and with more lasting effects) when processing information via the central 
route, and this in turn happens when individuals have the ability (sophistication) and the 
motivation (self-interest) to process the information.  Thus, this model provides a mechanism to 
lead us to expect a possible moderation effect on persuasion. 
 
Moderating Factor, Political Sophistication:    
Education is a critical component of political sophistication, as it leads to greater verbal and 
written skills that make it easier for people to process, understand, and utilize political messages 
(Nie et al. 1996).  But education is not sufficient for specifically political sophistication.  Rather, 
political knowledge reflects an engagement in politics deep enough to lead to political learning.  
As a result, we conceive of political sophistication as combining education and political 
knowledge, in this case about U.S. politics.  In practice, we have a homogenous subject 
population and therefore limited variation in levels of attained education.  We observe greater 
variation on political knowledge. 
Moderating Factor, Self-Interest:   
Peoples’ attitudes regarding self-interest should be of paramount importance because they are 
attitudes with the two most important cognitive constructs – self and ego (Sears and Funk 1991).  
Self-interested attitudes should become salient when, “… [they are] related to the attainment of 
desired material goods or behavioral opportunities” (Boninger et al. 1995).  Such attitudes should 
be especially powerful because they are both hedonically relevant (related to happiness) and are 
perceived to have important consequences.  People should pay closer attention to the details of 
arguments regarding such issues, resulting in greater thought about the topic, development of 
stronger attitudes with greater complexity and with greater openness to being persuaded (Petty 
and Cacioppo 1986).  
By self-interest we mean “vested interests,” a theory that defines self interest as the 
individual’s perception that the attitude object has personal consequences.  This is drawn from 
William Crano’s theory (1995) which requires that the attitude object be perceived to be 
hedonically relevant and consequential (Lehman and Crano 2002).  Vested interests stand in 
contrast to the traditional conceptualization of self-interest, which is that a person’s mere 
membership in a group that would benefit from a policy would constitute self-interest (e.g. Sears 
and Funk 1991). 
Some immigrant/migrant workers will have a vested interest in free trade and many of 
them perceive that they do.  After all, millions of workers have traveled to the U.S., making 
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harrowing journeys for the promise of economic benefit.  However, a relationship to trade policy 
is neither immediate nor transparent. Thus, some, but not all migrant workers will make the 
connection.  Those who do perceive a vested interest in free trade will be more likely to have 
developed stronger attitudes and to process free trade messages via the central route.  Hence, as 
throughout, the effect may be priming or persuasion.  We expect that in the case of those workers 
who believe they benefit from free trade, a priming effect (that is, the effect of both the negative 
and positive messages) should increase support for free trade.  In other words, among workers 
who believe they benefit from free trade, priming the topic should increase their support for the 
policy. 
 
H3:  Moderation 
 
H3a: Priming:   Trade messages will have a greater effect among more 
sophisticated workers, compared to the less sophisticated. 
 
H3b: Persuasion:  Trade messages will be more persuasive among those 
who are more politically sophisticated and/or are higher in vested self-
interest compared to those who are not.  
 
Research Procedures:  Experiment 
The experiment was conducted at a religious community center in New Hope, North Carolina, on 
April 28, 2002.  This is an Episcopalian center that serves farm workers in the area.  In all, 73 
individuals participated in the study.  Participants were randomly assigned to one of the three 
experimental groups.  The positive treatment group had 25 individuals, while the negative and 
control groups each had 24.4  The experimental treatment, newspaper articles, and surveys were 
all in Spanish. 
 Procedure:  At the beginning of each session, the experiment moderator greeted the 
group and explained that this was a study concerning attitudes toward current events, keeping 
our exact purpose unclear.  Next, the moderator for each group read aloud three newspaper 
articles.  The positive and negative treatments were embedded in the middle of two neutral 
articles.  The positive treatment described how the forces of globalization would combine to 
propel the United States toward greater prosperity.  The negative treatment presented a much 
bleaker picture, one where employment opportunities were being taken from Americans.5  The 
control group was read three neutral articles.  The globalization articles were based on actual 
newspaper stories, taken from local newspapers and translated into Spanish.  We include the 
articles in appendix A.   
After the articles were read, the participants filled out a survey.  This first portion 
consisted of a set of demographic questions, thus also serving as a distracter task.  The second 
portion of the survey dealt with questions on current events, policy preferences, and the various 
measures used in our analysis.  Upon the completion of the survey, each participant was 
debriefed and compensated with an amount of $10.   
 Obviously, the study participants do not represent a random sample of migrant farm 
workers.  Indeed, scholars rarely have access to such samples of this population because of the 
extraordinary logistical problems.  As a result, we cannot claim that our results can be 
generalized to the population of migrant farm workers.  We do, however, make two points about 
the strength of the design.  First, while we cannot generalize our results to the population, the 
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randomization of the treatment does allow us to make definitive statements about how our 
treatments caused certain effects among the migrant workers we study here.  In other words, we 
are clear that the positive and negative messages had certain effects, and these effects can be 
used to falsify our theory, as it applies to these workers. 
Second, the participants in our study are similar to the wider community of migrant 
workers in a number of important ways  Table 1 compares a few of the key demographic 
characteristics of the experimental participants to the same characteristics of all migrant workers 
in the U.S.  One can see that in many aspects the demographic characteristics of the workers we 
studied are similar to the characteristics of migrant workers in the U.S.  The participants in our 
study are 78% male, while 80% of all migrant workers are male.  The median number of years of 
schooling is identical.  The annual household income is similar as well.  Two thirds of the 
participants in the experiment had household incomes below $14,000, while two thirds of all 
migrant workers in the U.S had household incomes below $12,500 (as of 1998).  In addition, 3% 
of the migrant workers who completed the experiment lived with their parents, while 4% of 
migrant workers nationally live with their parents.  One difference between the two groups is that 
the participants in the experiment had been in the U.S. a short amount of time, compared to 
migrant workers as a whole (this reflects North Carolina serving as a new destination for 
migrants).  As a whole, however, the research participants are similar to farm workers nationally, 
suggesting that our results may serve as a good approximation of the results that would be 
obtained had we drawn the participants from a national sample. 
 
Table 1. 
North Carolina Migrant Worker Participant Pool Demographics Compared to National 
Migrant Worker Demographics 
 
 North Carolina Participant Pool
a
 National Demographics
b
 
Gender               76% male          80% male 
 
Median years                     7        7 
of schooling 
 
Annual Household          2/3 below $14,000       2/3 below $12,500 
income 
 
Lives with parents                     3%        4% 
 
Median number of                     3        10 
years in the U.S. 
a  The demographic characteristics of the participants in the experiment conducted in New Hope, N.C. 
b  The demographic characteristics of all migrant workers as of 1998 (Mehta et al 2000). 
 
Research Design:  Focus Group 
We also conducted a focus group on November 15, 2003 to better understand how 
immigrant/migrant farm workers conceive of free trade, their self interest, and the role of 
government, as explained in their own words.  The focus group was conducted at the same site as 
the experiment.  None of the focus group participants had been subjects in the experiment.  Four 
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men and one woman participated in the focus group, all of whom were Mexican farm laborers 
working in the surrounding area.  We did not ask for further individuating demographic 
information.  Upon the completion of the focus group each participant received $20.   
 
Results 
Focus Group  
One major purpose of the focus group is to enable participants to speak directly to these issues, 
demonstrating an awareness of them and, thus, the existence of a set of beliefs in this domain.  
That they do have such beliefs is apparent as we report specific responses.  We hypothesize, for 
example, that the relationship between the experimental treatment and support for free trade is 
mediated by valuation of active government.  Support or opposition to government intervention 
is a value that should influence subsequent economic considerations.  The desire to see a less 
active American government was voiced throughout the focus group session.  “I believe there are 
more opportunities, and wanting to we could make it in all levels like knowing more 
English…and we would have more opportunities if we could work freely” [emphasis added].  
More specifically, the participants highlighted the desire of the American government to remove 
restrictions on citizenship documentation.  “I think the government should give more 
opportunities to Hispanics, like more freedom.  Having more freedom, we could go to the 
airports and take planes from one place to another.”  The general sentiment among the 
participants was opposition to American governmental intervention regarding work 
opportunities.  However, at one point a participant did state that, “we need a steady salary plus 
some compensations to have more stability” [emphasis added].   
 Another theoretically germane topic of discussion concerned whether the participants felt 
that they had benefited from free trade policies.  In other words, is free trade in their self-
interest?  In response to this direct query, the assessment was not very positive.  Most of the 
participants focused on their present hardships, rather than on the relationship between free trade 
and their general situation.  “People in Mexico think that we come here and we have a great life, 
but that is not true because we come here to suffer and not eat well.  This is because we don’t 
earn enough to live as they say.”  One participant joked about the negative response of another 
participant who said he did not like the United States, by saying, “the thing is that he hasn’t met 
a girl here.”  This anecdote is illustrative of the personal hardships that these immigrant/migrant 
workers must endure.  In addition to economic considerations, there are also personal 
considerations that factor into a general evaluation of free trade, and the belief that it has or has 
not benefited one.   
 The consensus was that free trade was not beneficial.  Three out of the five participants 
specifically mentioned that it is big business that benefits from free trade in response to the 
question, “Do you feel that the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has benefited 
you somehow?”  However, when the group was asked to compare their present situation to their 
past situation in Mexico, they concluded that being in the United States is essentially the lesser 
of two evils.  “I feel we have to work to make it.  It’s hard but possible…Here there are more 
opportunities.  In Mexico, you can be the most hard worker and not make it because there is no 
work.”  The wage differential between Mexico and the United States was pointed out at various 
points, specifically with regards to the lower purchasing power of Mexican wages.  “In Mexico?  
No, over there I worked for 6 years and could not even buy a radio!”  Another participant stated, 
“Even if there is work [in Mexico] the things are expensive.  Yes, well, a two-liter soda is 25 
pesos, and if I’m earning 100 pesos, I only have left 75 pesos.”   
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 We will return to this evidence below because some of the focus group discussion 
directly mirrors the experimental evidence and helps bring it to life.  For now, we conclude that 
the results from this focus group provide a better understanding of the experimental results we 
present below.  More importantly, the focus group contributes to seeing the human face of 
globalization without filters. Because this is an understudied population, qualitative research is 
necessary for informing theoretical frameworks and empirical results.  The focus group 
participants live hard lives; however, it is implicit that their hard lives were harder in Mexico 
where there are fewer job opportunities and wages are a fraction of those in the United States.  
This issue provides preliminary evidence of the existence of a vested interest in free trade.  
Opposition to government intervention in the specific area of job opportunities, in contrast, was a 
clear theme among the focus group participants.  This is an important value and one that we 
further consider below as a possible mediator.   
 
Experiment 
We now turn to the experimental results by testing the three hypotheses developed above, each 
of the three being further divided into priming and persuasion effects.  The first concerns direct 
effects of the experimental treatment on support for free trade.  The second is whether valuing an 
active government mediates that direct effect.  The third examines whether the effects of the 
treatment are moderated by political sophistication or by vested interest. 
We randomly assigned the research participants to the three experimental conditions 
(positive message, negative message, and no message [the control condition]).  We compared the 
participants’ demographic characteristics between the three groups to assess whether the 
randomization appeared to “work” (that is, involved no major instances of a randomly induced 
but unexpected empirical correlation; these results are not reported but available on request).  
The design with apparently successful randomization allows us to claim, with confidence, that 
any observed treatment effect is causal.  
As we pointed out, the participants in the experiment were not a randomly selected subset 
of migrant farm workers, and therefore we cannot make statistical inferences about any but the 
treatment variables.  Nonetheless, we report the results, including inferential statistics, which is 
what we would have estimated if there had been randomization over subject participants.  We 
use the inferential statistics as a guide in determining whether we should accept or reject the null 
hypothesis, but with respect to these research participants only.  
To test the first two hypotheses we estimate each model (treatment as prime and 
treatment as valence) for the full sample.  The priming tests compare those receiving a treatment 
to the control group that received none.  The persuasion tests contrast those receiving the positive 
treatment with those receiving the negative messages (and of course, we compare each group to 
the control group also).  The second hypothesis is tested by the addition of the mediator variable, 
valuing active government, presented in Figure 1.  
The final set of hypotheses repeats the above analyses separately for those who reported 
that they believed that they benefited from or did not benefit from free trade and for those high 
and those low in political sophistication, with both classifications determined by median splits.  
Vested self-interest was measured by a question that asked, “Do you think you personally 
benefited from free trade agreements between countries, for example the North American Free 
Trade Agreement between the United States and Mexico?”  The political sophistication scale is 
the combination of general sophistication (years of formal education) and of relevant political 
knowledge (recognition of the names of the two U.S. political parties).    The estimate of the 
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effects of the treatment-as-prime variable for each of the three hypotheses is presented in Table 
2.  Table 3 likewise reports for all hypotheses the effects of the positive and of the negative 
treatment variables as persuasive messages for the direct, mediated, and moderated effects.   
Note that the coefficients provide only part of the information needed to test the 
mediation effects hypotheses because they represent only the direct effects:  the indirect effects 
that operate through active government are ascertained by conducting additional analyses.  
However, the coefficients reported in Tables 2 and 3 are sufficient for testing the other two sets 
of hypotheses.  We therefore review the evidence for the first and third hypotheses first, and then 
turn to the more complex inferences that we need to make to test the second, mediation, and 
hypothesis.  All estimates were conducted via OLS unless indicated otherwise.  We utilize one-
tailed tests for the directional hypotheses, and two-tailed tests for the priming tests, with one 
exception.  In the case of those who believe they benefited from free trade, we expect that if the 
messages operate as a prime, then both messages will increase support for free trade, because 
they would prime those having a self-interest, which in our context is necessarily perceiving 
benefits from free trade.  As a result, we utilize one-tailed hypothesis tests for the impact of the 
treatment on support for free trade among this group. 
 
Table 2  
Free Trade Messages as a Prime:  OLS Regression  
Estimates for Support for Free Trade 
   1  2  3  4  5 
Prime          -.073          1.23*                 -.292         -.608         -.096 
           (.530)         (.860)         (.708)          (.732)         (.927) 
 
Constant           5.02**          3.98**           5.72**           5.58**           4.70** 
           (.434)         (.741)          (.477)          (.622)          (.722) 
F-Statistic  .02           2.04  .17  .69  .01 
R2   .00  .03  .01  .02  .00 
N    73   35   22   36   28 
* p<.10 one-tailed, ** p<.01 two-tailed 
Model 1 includes all experiment participants.  Model 2 includes participants with high vested 
interest.  Model 3 includes participants with low vested interest.  Model 4 includes participants 
high in political sophistication.  Model 5 includes participants low in political sophistication. 
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Table 3  
Free Trade Messages as Valences:  OLS Regression Estimates  
for Support for Free Trade 
   1  2  3  4  5 
Positive Message    -.236          1.28*               .777         -.897         -.573 
           (.610)         (.921)         (1.26)          (.819)          (1.12) 
 
Negative Message     .097          1.12                -.560         -.270          .327 
           (.616)         (1.10)          (.753)          (.847)          (1.08) 
 
Constant           5.02**          3.98**           5.72**           5.58**           4.70** 
           (.436)         (.752)          (.476)          (.626)          (.727) 
F-Statistic  .16           1.00  .61  .67  .30 
R2   .00  .06  .06  .04  .02 
N    73   35   22   36   28 
* p<.10 one-tailed, ** p<.01 two-tailed 
Model 1 includes all experiment participants.  Model 2 includes participants with high 
vested interest.  Model 3 includes participants with low vested interest.  Model 4 includes 
participants high in political sophistication.  Model 5 includes participants low in political 
sophistication. 
 
Turning to column 1 in Tables 2 and 3, one observes that we can reject the hypothesis of 
direct effects of the treatment on support for free trade policy.6  Neither of the messages served 
as a prime, nor did the messages have different effects due to their acting as persuasive 
messages.7  
There is support for the third hypothesis, however (we return to the second hypothesis 
below).  For those high in self interest, turning to column 2 reveals that the treatment variable is 
significant at p< .1 level when tested as a prime.8  That is, compared to the control group, those 
who were high in vested self-interest were significantly more likely to favor free trade.  Notice, 
in Table 3, this effect is significant for those receiving the pro-free trade message.  The evidence 
is not consistent with persuasion, however, as the negative treatment had nearly the same-sized 
coefficient, with the same and thus wrong sign.  Indeed, that the two treatments are essentially 
the same is precisely what we would expect if the treatment was a prime and not persuasive.  The 
obvious interpretation is that those who felt they benefited from free trade responded to either 
message by having their vested interest in free trade made more accessible, and that accessing 
these attitudes about benefiting personally from free trade led them, in turn, to be more 
supportive of policies that make trade freer.   
These results speak to the structure of the workers’ free trade attitudes.  The fact that the 
positive and negative messages did not move the workers’ support for free trade in the positive 
and negative directions suggests that their free trade attitudes are too crystallized to be affected 
by these messages.  Given that many of these workers made dramatic choices to leave their 
families and travel to the U.S. to work, if they link these choices to free trade policy, then it is 
probably an issue they have given some thought to.  This is certainly the case among the migrant 
workers who believe that they have personally benefited from free trade:  the messages do not 
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have a persuasive effect, but they do prime their notions of having benefited, indicated by their 
increased support for free trade when receiving either the positive or negative message. 
As one can see by turning to columns 4 and 5 in Tables 2 and 3, there was no role for the 
political sophistication variable as moderator.  Column 4 reveals that among migrant workers 
high in sophistication, the free trade message as prime was statistically insignificant (in Table 3), 
as was the message as valence (in Table 4).  The same pattern of results is apparent in Column 5 
of these two tables, where the same pattern holds for the workers low in sophistication.9   
Our focus-group discussions reinforce these findings.  During the course of a discussion 
that centered on the topics of free trade, the workers’ hardships, and immigration, most of the 
workers indicated that they live and work in the U.S. because they have more economic 
opportunities here.  Also, two of the workers attributed the NAFTA free trade agreement to 
affecting their lives in the U.S. directly.  One participant said that it generated more money for 
them: “What is the free trade agreement?  I believe it gives more freedom so that all countries 
can enter with their products and that gives [workers] more money.”  Another said that NAFTA 
was the direct cause of why (s) he immigrated to the U.S. to work.  We asked, “How has 
NAFTA affected you?”  One worker said, “Well, the fact that I’m here is how much it has 
affected me.”  Finally, another participant summed these points up well when (s) he said: 
 
NAFTA has affected us so much that we are here, precisely because we can’t 
compete with the cattle raising and agriculture because the technology is very 
rudimentary in our country [Mexico] and here technology is better.  We are 
badly paid, but any way, it’s better than over there.”  (Farm worker – 
interview; translated from Spanish) 
 
The focus group results suggest an important reason as to why vested interest would 
condition the relationship:  some of the workers hold NAFTA responsible for their economic 
choices.  The results from the focus group reinforce our findings of vested interest as a 
moderator variable, suggesting that some of the workers associate their own livelihoods, and life-
altering immigration choices, with trade policy.  The workers tell of the very dramatic choices 
they have made to make better economic lives for themselves and their families, and some of 
them clearly associate these dramatic decisions with free trade policies.  This link, and the life-
altering nature of the decisions, suggests that perhaps the type of worker who does make this link 
will also be the one who pays most attention to free trade messages. 
Let us return to the second hypothesis concerning mediation.  In this case, we are 
hypothesizing that the experimental messages do not only affect views about free trade policies, 
but that they are also mediated by the valuing of a more or a less active government.  The Sobel 
test (1982) provides a formal test of mediation.  The estimation of this test is based on OLS for 
each component of the test (Sobel 1982).  In our analysis, we can not use OLS for all model 
estimations because the active government value variable is an ordinal, three-category variable 
for which ordered logit is a superior estimation procedure.  As a result, we use a modified 
version of the Sobel test, substituting the ordered logit for the OLS estimates.   
Given the results for hypotheses one and three reported above, we test the mediation 
hypotheses only for the case of priming among those high in vested self interest.   We present the 
results in Figure 1.  The coefficient for the positive treatment among those with high vested self-
interest is statistically significant in its relationship to the valuing of active government, and 
there is a strong relationship between that value and position on the trade policy, even controlling 
The Journal of Latino-Latin American Studies  39 
The Journal of Latino-Latin American Studies, Volume 3, Number 2, Fall 2008, pp. 26-46 
for the direct effect of the treatment on trade policy.10  Those with high vested interest who were 
primed by the treatment had a lower valuing of active government.  As we expected, our OLS 
estimates for the trade policy variable revealed that the more workers valued having an active 
government, the lower their support for free trade policy.  The treatment operated as a prime, 
increasing the workers’ support for free trade.11 
 
 
Figure 1:  
Free Trade Support among “Self-Interested” Latino Farm 
Workers
Treatment FT Support
2
Value Active Government
1
(-) p<.05** (-) p<.001**
(+) p<.15*
Pseudo R2 = .09
R2 = .51
** p-values for two-tailed tests
* p-value for one-tailed test
1 The effect of the treatment on value active government is estimated using ordered logit.
2 The effect of the treatment and value active government on support for free trade is estimated 
using OLS.  
 
While we could only conduct an analogue of the Sobel test, we did find that our model 
results met the criteria for when a variable mediates between two other factors (Sobel 1982).  
First, the treatment variable did significantly affect the valuing of an active government.  
Expressed as a difference in means, the treatment decreased support for active government by 
.95 (on a three point scale) at the .05 two-tailed level of statistical significance.12  Second, the 
treatment was, as required by the test, significantly related to trade policy in the absence of the 
mediator: we find that the treatment increased support for free trade by 1.23 (on a seven-point 
scale) at the .10 one-tailed level of statistical significance in the absence of the values variable 
(as reported in Table 1).  Third, the mediating variable was, as necessary, substantially related to 
the dependent variable in the absence of the treatment variable:  we find that the value active 
government variable decreased support for free trade by 1.98 points, at the .001 level of 
statistical significance, without controlling for the treatment.  Finally, the effect of the treatment 
on trade policy was, in fact, reduced when controlling for the values variable.  Once the political 
value of active government was included in the model, the effect of the treatment dropped to 
1.19 at the .15 one-tailed level of statistical significance.    In turn, support for active government 
decreased support for free trade policies by 1.75 points at the .001 level of statistical 
significance.13 
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Conclusion 
Our results provide support for one specific complex of results.  We find a significant mediated 
and moderated effect of the experimental treatment serving as a prime on support for free trade 
policies.  Thus we find evidence in support of the priming version of hypotheses two and three.  
Latino migrant workers’ beliefs about the benefits they received from free trade made all of the 
difference in terms of how they processed free trade messages and applied them to policy 
considerations.  The vested interest condition clearly tapped an underlying motivational factor.  
While the messages did not affect the free trade preferences of the workers as a whole, when we 
restricted the analysis to those high in vested interest the messages primed the concept and 
increased their support for free trade.    There are, of course, several reasons why this might be 
true, but one of the most promising of these is that only those who were vested in the issue via 
self-interest had sufficiently strong attitudes (or even had attitudes at all) in this domain for the 
prime to increase their accessibility.  This view is also consistent with our positive findings with 
respect to priming but not to persuasion. 
We began with the question of “where Latino migrant workers are at” with respect to free 
trade policy.  We cannot generalize our results to all migrant workers in the U.S., but the results 
do speak to the beliefs of these migrant workers, in particular.  First off, 61% of workers 
supported increasing free trade while just 30% supported restricting free trade.  The experimental 
results suggest that the workers we studied have a fairly firm opinion about their support for free 
trade.  While the positive and negative messages did move support, the only group for whom the 
change was statistically significant was among those who believe they benefit from free trade.  
This priming effect suggests that, because they believe they benefit from such policies, exposure 
to any kind of message about free trade (be it positive or negative) reminds them of their belief in 
this benefit and increases support for the policy.  Among the other groups of workers we 
considered, the changes were too small to be considered significant in a statistical sense. 
This brings us to our final point -- about the implications of our results for democratic 
theory.  Scholars are increasingly addressing the fact that Western democracies are home to 
millions and millions of immigrants who lead long and productive lives in these nations, and yet 
are excluded from the rights and privileges of citizenship (e.g. Heisler 2005, Benhabib 2005, and 
Baubock 2005).  Even though the subjects of our research are not American citizens, our results 
matter in terms of their consequences for democracy.  Democratic theory demands that we take 
account of the opinions of everyone who is affected by public policy.  While these Latino 
migrant workers cannot vote, a robust view of democracy calls for their voices to be heard.  The 
trade policies of the U.S. are policies that impact these worker’s lives in a direct and powerful 
way, as the workers themselves attested in the focus group.  Our results indicate that the migrant 
workers we studied tend to support such policies, and their attitudes on this subject are pretty 
firm.  Their voices and the effects of policy on their lives need to be heard beyond the confines 
of scholarly focus groups and statistical analyses. 
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Appendix A:   
Neutral Articles and Treatment Articles 
 
Neutral Articles 
 
“Mexico to Destroy Tunnel” 
 
The Mexican authorities began the destruction of a secret drug tunnel. The tunnel is located at 
the border and was utilized by one of the most feared bands of Mexican drug traffickers.  Tons of 
cocaine and marijuana were smuggled into the United States through this border. 
 
 Both workers and soldiers entered the 335 meter long tunnel to begin its demolition.  They have 
destroyed various support sections.  They will then proceed to fill the tunnel with cement.  The 
entrance of the tunnel will also be blocked off with an earth filling. 
 
 Assistant prosecutor, Jose Jorge Camps, said that engineers inspected portions of the tunnel in 
an effort to gather as much information as possible about the construction of the tunnel. 
 
The existence of the tunnel was made known to American drug enforcement agents through an 
anonymous tip-off.  The tunnel was 1.3 meters wide and 1.3 meters tall.  The tunnel began under 
a private residence in the mountains east of San Diego and ran 100 kilometers to Tecate, a 
Mexican border town.  
 
“El Niño could drown out the Korea-Japan World Cup” 
 
Experts assure that the meteorological phenomenon of  “El Niño” could ravage the Asian 
continent during the 2002 Korea-Japan World Cup.  These experts also stated that the first signs 
of the storm will be seen during the first days of June.  These dates coincide with the first games 
of the World Cup 
 
The 2002 World Cup will take place in both South Korea and Japan.  Events begin May 31 and 
will conclude June 30.  A total of 32 national soccer teams will participate in the tournament. 
 
 “Los Angeles Cardinal denies sexual abuse accusation” 
 
In an unexpected declaration, the head of one of the largest Catholic archdiocese in the United 
Sates, stated that he was accused of sexual abuse.  The incident is said to have taken place 32 
years ago. 
 
 Cardinal Mahoney, himself, revealed the charges-and he energetically denied them-in a three 
page statement. 
 
  The woman, who is now 51 years old, said she was knocked unconscious in a fight with other 
students at Joaquin Memorial Catholic junior high in Fresno, California.  When she awoke, she 
was not wearing any underwear and Cardinal Mahoney was standing beside her. 
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The woman states that she is now unable to work and take anti-depressants.  She added, that a 
psychiatrist diagnosed her as a paranoid schizophrenic. 
  
Cardinal Mahoney has denied any accusation.  He has stated that he will take the necessary 
measures in order to defend his integrity and personal reputation. 
personal.   
 
Positive Article 
 
“Unshakable U.S. prosperity” 
 
Washington, D.C. -- Over the next 20 years, the forces of globalization will combine to propel 
the American economy past inevitable obstacles.  America won’t relive the Golden Age, but this 
pattern of long-run progress will recur.  A key factor in this recipe for success is the United 
States’ involvement in cross-national trade agreements, such as NAFTA. 
 
Recently, business and government leaders discussed the strategies and successes of American 
companies under NAFTA during a major conference organized by the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce, “NAFTA: Five Years Later.”  At the conference, executives and government 
officials explained how Mexican companies have been able to source materials in the United 
States – rather than Asia or Europe – because NAFTA makes U.S. products more competitive. 
 
“The successes of NAFTA are impossible to ignore,” said Charlie Smith, vice-president of the 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce. He cited U.S. Commerce Department figures that show that, under 
NAFTA, the number of export-related jobs has increased by 1.7 million.  In addition, more than 
11.5 million U.S. jobs are in the export sector, and these jobs pay an average of 15 percent more 
than non-trade-related jobs.  In 1997, 46 out of 50 U.S. States had experienced growth in export 
sales to Mexico since NAFTA’s enactment. 
 
 “The results have paid off for American corporations, workers and consumers as companies find 
a dynamic market for exports, as wages increase and unemployment falls, and as the cost of 
goods decreases while quality increases,” Smith said. 
U.S. exports directly account for more than a third of the United States’ economic growth.  As 
Kenneth H. “Buddy” McKay, special envoy of President Clinton, noted at the Chamber’s 
conference, economic integration throughout the world is a key to the United States’ continued 
economic prosperity. 
 
Negative Article 
 
“Globalization hits hard, American, Southern workers” 
 
Greensboro – American workers today are feeling more insecure about their economic future.  
This persistent worker insecurity is due in large part to our increased integration in the world 
economy. 
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In this globalized world, U.S. corporations are increasingly setting up shop in low-wage 
countries, leaving American workers out in the cold.  For example, Nike sneakers now 
subcontracts all its production to companies operating in low-wage, non-union countries.  GM 
recently signed a contract with a developing Asian country to build another production facility 
overseas. 
 
A recent study by the Economic Policy Institute (EPI) found that the South has accounted for 
over a third of the U.S. jobs lost to NAFTA, more than any other part of the country.   
 
Economic woes in North Carolina mirror developments in other areas of the country with large 
chunks of their economies invested in sectors threatened by globalization.  Last year, 32,000 jobs 
disappeared because of plant closings and layoffs – 43 percent more than in 1988. 
 
In Columbus County, North Carolina, people are in turmoil.  “It would be an understatement to 
say that our county has been damaged by NAFTA,” said Bill Johnson, a county employee.  More 
appropriate, he said, “would be to say that we were devastated.  Two years ago, we had 2,500 to 
3,000 textile jobs.  Today they’re all gone – they all went South to Mexico …  That’s a $20 
million payroll loss.” 
 
Even when plants do not shut down, increased economic activity negatively affects workers 
because employers threaten to shut the plant down and leave the country if they don’t comply 
with bad work practices.  According to the EPI study, workers are increasingly reluctant to file 
unfair labor practice charges in response to plant closing threats.  As expected, Mexico was the 
country most often mentioned in plant closing threats. 
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Endnotes 
                                               
1 Mediation is defined as the effect of free trade messages on support for free trade operating through a political 
value.  Moderation is defined as globalization messages having greater effects among the more politically 
sophisticated workers, or among workers who believe they have a high degree of self-interest in free trade, 
compared to other workers. 
2 In other words, the pro- and con- free trade messages may have greater effects on support for free trade among 
some workers compared to others. 
3 We recognize that the view that values can be influenced by messages such as our treatment is controversial (e.g. 
Sears and Funk 1991, 1999).  However, we adopt a less rigid view of values.  James McCann (1997) argues that 
values are not more stable than other attitudes and presents evidence that values are unstable over time.  
Furthermore, Boninger et al. (1995) present evidence that self-interest causes people to think of their political 
values, and Baron and Leshner (2000) find that protected values are labile and amenable to change when challenged 
4 Experimental treatment groups with 25 participants (or less, frequently) are common in psychology and political 
psychology.  The goal is to have enough participants to detect treatment effects.  Treatment groups of 25 are of 
sufficient size to detect treatment effects of large or moderate size (Keppel 1991). 
5 We realize that these articles treated effects to the U.S. and this may not exert as strong an influence on the 
Mexican participant pool.  We also recognize the possibility that some of the respondents in the negative treatment 
may have recognized that the job loss of Americans may actually be good for them. However, we are concentrating 
on the cueing of negative outcomes, and the economic insecurity that the negative treatment presented.   
6 We measured support for free trade with the question:  “Some people think the government should restrict trade 
between the United States and other nations.  Other people feel that it is important to increase trade, without 
imposing any restrictions, between the United States and other nations.  Where a one indicates that government 
should restrict trade, and a seven indicates that government should increase trade, where would you place yourself?” 
7 Support for free trade was higher than opposition:  61% of study participants desired to increase trade, while just 
30% wished to decrease it. 
8 While p<.10, one-tailed test, is below the traditional p-value of .05, we provide two reasons as to why we view this 
more relaxed standard as sufficient.  First, as is typical with experimental designs, we employ relatively few 
participants.  Even without a random sample, we found access to large numbers of this population hard to come by.  
As a result of the limited cases, it is more difficult to obtain statistical significance.  Second, the tradition in 
empirical social science is to relax empirical standards with the first study on a given topic in the effort to broaden 
the topics and questions entertained by social scientists (e.g. Pan 2004).  As we alluded to earlier, ours is the first 
study to consider the free trade attitudes of migrant workers in the U.S. 
9 We suspect that these results are due to the lack of questions with meaningful variance on sophistication within a 
group as homogenous as this set of subjects.  While we observed a good deal of variance in the degree to which the 
migrant workers believe they benefit from free trade policy, the variance in their sophistication (formal years of 
education and recognition of the names of the two U.S. political parties) is much more limited. 
10 We cannot, of course, infer that the effect of active government on trade policy also occurs in the population. 
11 These results are available from the authors upon request. 
12 One would imagine that among workers who believe they benefit from free trade, causing them to think about it 
would cause their support for active government (the value that is counter to free trade) to decrease. 
13 We do not report these results in table, but they are available from the authors upon request. 
